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Theme: Despite the preliminary nature of the available data, what are the underlying, 
intermediate and proximate causes of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, its main 
consequences and possible future developments? 
 
 
Summary: A little over a month after the Macondo well started gushing oil off the Gulf of 
Mexico, Carol Browner1 said ‘this is probably the biggest environmental disaster we have 
ever faced in this country’. This overarching statement is yet to be precisely quantified and 
qualified in order to be able to make a full damage assessment, necessary to help in 
planning compensation and the restoration of the damaged environment. In this ARI it is 
argued that a preliminary discussion of the causes of the oil spill and a brief reflection on 
its consequences can shed light on the key issues and help understand accidental oil 
spills such as this. The analysis is also intended to bring to the fore some of the recently 
suggested improvements in safety initiatives as well as the political and oil-industry fallout. 
 
 
 
Analysis:  
Underlying, Intermediate and Proximate Causes 
Current and future world-wide oil dependency, along with the ever-increasing need for 
deep and ultra-deep water offshore drilling, are the main underlying causes of the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster and of other accidental oil spills. Furthermore, the apotheosis 
of the ‘shareholder value’ management model –which places a premium on internal cost 
cutting– among the large international oil companies (the IOCs) over the last 20 years, 
together with a lax regulatory oversight –stemming from the increasingly collaborative 
relationship between oil companies and their public regulators– are the leading 
intermediate causes of the Macondo disaster. Finally, the proximate causes of the spill 
are the less-than-optimal safety conditions in force at the well and offshore rig at the time 
of the explosion. While safety risks are to some degree inherent to deepwater drilling, the 
underlying cause of an overriding oil dependency, along with IOC cost-cutting and 
producer-state regulatory laxity have severely aggravated the threat. 
 
Underlying Causes 
According to the Energy Information Agency (EIA), 37.1% of US primary energy 
consumption in 2008 came from oil.2 This is similar to Europe, according to the European 
Commission.3 Additionally, 40% of the oil consumed in the US is home-grown in oil-
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producing states such as Texas, Alaska, California and Louisiana. These four states 
produced 52% of US crude oil in 2007, of which 25% came from offshore platforms4 in the 
Gulf of Mexico such as the Deepwater Horizon platform in the Macondo Prospect oil field 
where an explosion killed 11 workmen and caused an oil spill that lasted from 20 April to 
15 July 2010. 
 
Map 1 shows the myriad of active leases in the outer continental shelf in the Gulf of 
Mexico, where there are 3,800 active oil platforms. 
 
Map 1. The Gulf of Mexico: active leases in the outer continental shelf 
 
Source: Mineral Services Database in Department of the Interior (2010: 3). 
 
In a broader perspective, oil dependency is expected to continue under the EIA’s 
reference scenario. This means, ceteris paribus, a high likelihood of future spills.5 Howard 
Gruenspecht, Deputy Administrator of EIA, said in May this year that in the absence of 
further policy changes to curb demand, fossil fuels will provide approximately 80% of 
world energy consumption by 2035, with petroleum liquids remaining the most important 
energy source within that mix. 
 
Figure 1 below shows energy use at the world level by type of fuel type from 1990 to 
2035. 
 
                                                 
4 http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/infosheets/crudeproduction.html. 
5 Indeed, another offshore oil platform, the Vermilion 380 owned by Mariner Energy, exploded in the Gulf of 
Mexico on 2 September 2010; although there were no deaths, the fire was extinguished and there appears to 
be little possibility of the incident causing a BP-type spill. 
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Figure 1. World marketed energy use by fuel type 
 
Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/highlights.html. 
 
In addition to the level of high global oil dependency, approximately 70% of the oil fields 
discovered in this century are located offshore. Deep and ultra-deep water drilling has 
allowed the exploitation of previously unreachable oil deposits using the latest technology, 
although the challenges inherent to such endeavours are many. Some of these were 
recently reviewed by Mariano Marzo, Professor of Energy Resources at the University of 
Barcelona, and include high pressures, low temperatures and potential methane 
explosions, among others. In order to surmount these challenges minimum safety 
conditions and enforceable standards are paramount. 
 
Intermediate Causes 
Safety standards appear to have been compromised systemically within the oil industry in 
recent years, but this is particularly clear and nearly indisputable in the case of BP. Given 
the underlying cause behind the need for increasing offshore deep-water exploration and 
drilling –significant economic dependence on oil–, two independent but interlocking 
developments in the oil world have tended to increase the safety and environmental risks 
of offshore oil production, particularly in deep and ultra-deep waters. These two 
phenomena have contributed to the kind of lapses which unleashed the Macondo spill 
and, unless they are addressed by corporate behaviour and public policy, will make future 
spills even more likely. 
 
The emergence of the ‘shareholder value’ management model within the global oil 
industry, but particularly among the largest companies, has compromised internal 
technical rigour and undermined safety and environmental standards and procedures. 
Over the last 25 years, ever since the oil price collapse of 1985-86, the US stock market 
crash of 1987 and the liberalisation of the global financial sector beginning in that same 
decade, the major oil companies have followed a very short-term profit-maximisation 
strategy in order to create maximum value for their investors through share buybacks (and 
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the resulting rise in share prices) and large and increasing dividend payouts to 
shareholders. While shareholder value can be enhanced through investment leading to 
future increases in output, revenue and profit, in the short term it is most effectively and 
rapidly achieved by intense internal cost-cutting. Much has been written in recent years 
about the negative impact on investment rates and future production levels within the oil 
industry as a result of the predominance of such corporate behaviour across the sector. 
However, only now –in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon-Macondo blowout– can the 
impact of such a management strategy upon safety risks be clearly identified. The 
pressure to contain and cut costs, all the way down from the CEO to the offshore platform 
workers, inevitably compromises physical and environmental safety when such an 
intermediate objective is pushed too far. BP’s increasingly poor safety and environmental 
record –which in the last five years alone includes, among others, the pipeline spill in 
Alaska (due to neglected pipeline corrosion), the Texas City refinery explosion (which 
killed 15 people) and now the deepwater well blowout in the Gulf of Mexico– can be seen 
as the inevitable eventual consequence of the short-term profit maximisation and cost-
cutting criteria that have come to dominate the oil industry. BP epitomises this tendency 
and has come to represent the highest expression of what is essentially a strategic 
business model that is widespread among the majors and super majors. 
 
But the long chain of fallout deriving from the industry’s overwhelming reliance on the 
short-term profit motive –crystallised in and epitomised by BP’s spill in the Gulf– is only 
part of the story. The ‘revolution’ of smaller (and supposedly smarter, more effective) 
government under Presidents Reagan and Clinton proved to be another exercise in cost-
cutting at any expense, only in this case on the State’s behalf. As a result, over the last 25 
years the US Interior Department and the oil sector regulator which it houses (formerly the 
Minerals Management Service, or MMS, now the Office of Ocean Energy Management) 
has been faced with reduced budgets and an expansion of required tasks. The result has 
been a government-encouraged partnership with the industry that is supposedly being 
supervised and regulated (a clear example of regulatory capture). With state regulation 
and intervention devalued across the board, and the shareholder’s profit exalted, the last 
25 years have seen an increase in human and environmental accidents and other forms 
of collateral damage to the environments and societies where oil companies operate. 
 
The systematic cost-cutting undertaken to maximise short-term profit, along with the 
global devaluation of the State’s unique and independent role as regulator of the oil 
industry, have together paved the way for the Macondo spill and for other disasters like it 
in the future. 
 
Proximate Causes 
Tony Hayward, BP’s outgoing CEO, recognised that the spill should have been avoided. 
Despite the ongoing investigations it has been argued that safety faults such as having 
less than the recommended amount of centralisers on the platform or faults in blowout 
preventers (henceforth, BOP)6 can be considered the proximate causes of the spill. These 
prevention issues plus the lack of effective management measures resulted in the 
continued gushing of oil for roughly three months. Thus, BP was cutting corners in safety 
in the opinion of politicians, civil society, the media and its own shareholders. 
 
                                                 
6 Blowout preventers are devices designed to stop the flow of oil from wells. 
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According to the results of the four-month investigation conducted by BP, several factors 
contributed to the accident. These are summarised in Box 1 below. 
 
Box 1. Proximate causes of the spill according to BP 
• The cement and shoe track barriers –and in particular the cement slurry that was used– at the bottom 
of the Macondo well failed to contain hydrocarbons within the reservoir, as they were designed to do, 
and allowed gas and liquids to flow up the production casing. 
• The results of the negative pressure test were incorrectly accepted by BP and Transocean, although 
well integrity had not been established. 
• Over a 40-minute period, the Transocean rig crew failed to recognise and act on the influx of 
hydrocarbons into the well until the hydrocarbons were in the riser and rapidly flowing to the surface. 
• After the well-flow reached the rig it was routed to a mud-gas separator, causing gas to be vented 
directly on to the rig rather than being diverted overboard. 
• The flow of gas into the engine rooms through the ventilation system created a potential for ignition 
which the rig’s fire and gas system did not prevent. 
• Even after the explosion and fire had disabled its crew-operated controls, the rig’s blow-out preventer 
on the sea-bed should have activated automatically to seal the well. But it failed to operate, probably 
because critical components were not working. 
Source: http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7064893. 
 
Investigations 
Nine different investigations into the causes, responsibilities and consequences have 
been opened in the US since the 20 April Deepwater Horizon explosion. 
 
Consequences 
In addition to the tragic loss of lives, accidental oil spills have a myriad of economic, 
environmental and social consequences. They will be outlined briefly in turn, although 
they can never be precisely estimated until there is comprehensive information on the 
damage and foreseeable and complete recovery of the assets that have been damaged 
(García Negro et al., 2007). 
 
Economic Consequences 
It is arguably impossible to accurately value the environment. The primary value of the 
environment as the basis of all economic, human and non-human activity is well beyond 
the scope of market and non-market valuation. Ethical reasoning can additionally suggest 
that some would even find assigning money values to certain features of the environment 
morally repugnant. But when decisions have to be made, having the common measuring 
rod of money is of essence in the light of inevitable trade-offs. Market and non-market 
valuation techniques are hence considered to be useful in providing second-best proxies 
of the damages caused by spills. 
 
Use-values lost due to the spill include the direct and indirect use of the damaged 
environment. Fishing, tourism and related activities are all included in this category. 
According to the NOAA,7 in 2008 total fishing landing revenues from finfish and shell fish 
amounted to US$659 million and recreational fishermen made 24 million fishing trips. 
These figures are expected to drop significantly as a consequence of bans and of the 
reduction in recreational fishing trips. The time span for full recovery and associated costs 
will depend on a number of factors, such as the final extent of the spill (4.9 million barrels 
of oil) and the affected ecosystems and species. Long-term damages cannot be ruled out 
a priori. 
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Table 1 shows a summary of the characteristics of some of the affected commercial 
species and their economic relevance. 
 
Table 1. Affected commercial species and their economic relevance 
Species Value of landings (2008 figures) Comments 
Shrimps 
Alabama: US$38.4 million 
Florida: US$23.3 million 
Louisiana: US$130.6 million 
Mississippi: US$17.7 million 
Texas: US$157.2 million 
73% of total national landings come from  the GOM 
Blue crab 
Alabama: US$1.5 million 
West Florida: US$3.3 million 
Louisiana: US$32 million 
Mississippi: US$447,000 
Texas: US$2.3 million 
Louisiana accounts for 26% of the nation’s landings 
Oysters 
Alabama: US$243,414 
Florida: US$5.47 million 
Louisiana: US$38 million 
Mississippi: US$6.87 million 
Texas: US$8.83 million 
The GOM region lands 67% of US total 
Red snapper 
Alabama: US$ 237,141 
West Florida: US$2.94 million 
Louisiana: US$2.03 million 
Texas: US$2.74 million 
No data was available for Mississippi 
Source: NOAA (2010). 
 
As regards tourism, Florida was said to be the State most exposed to losses, that could 
run into millions as its tourism industry brings a ballpark figure of US$60 billion from 80 
million visitors. The industry furthermore employs 1 million people and yields 21% of state 
taxes on sales.8 Marketing campaigns to counteract the oil scare among tourists have 
been released since the spill and even President Obama has helped with a midsummer 
family swim and holiday on the affected coast. 
 
Policy-makers faced with other spills such as the Prestige, with tourism ‘hot spots’ 
affected, also designed strategies to counteract the drop in tourism (González Laxe, 
2003). The extent to which tourism will drop and the time span in which the drop will be 
significant will depend on the affected area, the expected recovery time and the 
perception, by society, of the state of the affected areas. In the Prestige spill, for instance, 
preliminary estimates of the drop in tourism in the year after the accidental spill ranged 
from 15% to 25%. These estimates were based on other spills such as the Erika (Prada 
Blanco & Vázquez Rodríguez, 2004). 
 
Non-use values such as existence, altruism and bequest values are not –or only 
imperfectly– captured by markets as they leave no behavioural trail. In order to determine 
these values, the techniques of preference such as contingent valuation or choice 
modelling can help evaluate changes in environmental goods and services.9 No data is 
available yet on the non-use (or passive use) values lost as a consequence of the BP 
spill. The many available CV studies on the topic might well be used in benefit transfers to 
                                                 
8 http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64T23R20100530. 
9 The US led the way not only in the initial development of these techniques but in groundbreaking 
applications –such as that of the Exxon Valdez contingent valuation study undertaken by Carson et al. (1992) 
and the analysis by the NOAA-convened Blue Ribbon panel (Arrow, et al., 1993)– of CV as a valid technique 
for estimating passive-use values and as the basis for natural-resource damage assessments. 
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estimate the value lost. Alternatively, a new CV study could be conducted once there is a 
full foreseeable recovery (and hence outraged responses are minimised). Until such 
studies arise it can only be hypothesised that the value will be substantial. 
 
Additionally, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 BP is responsible for funding the 
response and cleaning-up operations.10 There are no final cost estimates but recently 
released figures calculate the cost of BP’s response to the spill at US$8 billion. Added to 
this, US$100 million will be paid by BP to workers in the oil industry who have lost their 
jobs, US$10 million will be devoted to study the effects of the oil spill on health and a 
further US$ 500 million to analyse the spill’s environmental effects.11 BP also agreed to 
create a multi-annual fund of US$20 billion for forthcoming compensations. To this, 
significant penalties might be added if BP is found guilty of gross negligence. The costs 
have to be seen in conjunction with a 36% drop in the value of BP’s shares since the 
explosion,12 past rumours of hostile take-overs by rival firms, the indirect effect on British 
government revenues and payments to British pension funds. All these issues point to the 
far-reaching consequences of unsafe deep-oilfield drilling. The likelihood of explosions 
and accidental oil spills is low, but the ‘back-of-the-envelope’ cost estimates for BP can be 
a powerful incentive to hire risk-averse safety personnel with wide ranging power over oil 
spill prevention, preparedness and management operations. 
 
Environmental Consequences of the Spill 
Approximately 71% of the earth’s surface is covered by either oceans or large seas. 
Direct and indirect environmental services and functions provided by marine and coastal 
areas include, among others: food production, biodiversity, nutrient cycling, climate 
regulation, disease control, waste absorption, flood protection and cultural and 
recreational services (Hassan et al., 2005). Marine and coastal areas are linked through 
the use that species and humans make of these ecosystems. The Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (2005) acknowledges that there is no definitive regional or global 
management framework to guide the inevitable trade-offs between competing activities 
that might affect coastal areas. One such activity is oil exploration and its related 
hydrocarbon transport. Accidental oil spills such as that caused by the explosion of the 
Deepwater Horizon platform off the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010 or the Prestige oil spill off 
the Spanish coast in November 2002 are recent examples of the conflicts between 
environmental protection and economic development. 
 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment report expects oil spills to have a moderate 
impact on marine areas by 2025. Certain oil spills, however, cause long-term damage to 
marine and coastal ecosystems, especially if the areas affected are vulnerable or are 
already degraded. Accidental oil spills might not be the most serious threat to the marine 
environment but they are visible incidents that trigger policy action at various 
administrative and geographical levels, widespread media attention and civil society 
alarm, although according to a Pew survey,13 over half of the interviewees thought that 
efforts to control the spill would be successful, which is not uncommon in the second 
stage of alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm about environmental damages as 
analysed by the issue-attention cycle (Downs, 1972). In fact, the spill came to a halt in mid 
July. 
                                                 
10 http://www.epa.gov/BPSpill/qanda.html. 
11 http://www.bp.com/extendedsectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9034427&contentId=7063885. 
12 http://www.ksat.com/money/24921900/detail.html. 
13 http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1590/poll-gulf-oil-disaster-obama-bp-support-for-drilling. 
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The US National Wildlife Federation has reported damages to mammals, fish, birds, 
reptiles and habitats. A multitude of species rely on the Gulf’s ecosystems and these have 
been affected by the spill. Despite discrepancies between different institutions regarding 
the amount of oil that remains in the sea,14 there is consensus that the damage to species 
and ecosystems is far from over. Long-term damage is expected. This has been the case 
in past spills such as Exxon Valdez, Erika and Prestige, among many others. 
 
In relation to the existing discrepancies, the media has reported that 75% of the oil is gone 
whereas the National Incident Command (NIC) claimed that ‘burning, skimming and direct 
recovery from the wellhead removed one quarter (25%) of the oil released from the 
wellhead. One quarter (25%) of the total oil naturally evaporated or dissolved, and just 
less than one quarter (24%) was dispersed (either naturally or as a result of operations) 
as microscopic droplets into Gulf waters’. Scientists from the University of Georgia 
claimed however that, as much as 90% of the oil spill might remain in the Gulf of Mexico. 
On the other hand, some scientists have also reported that deep-sea bacteria 
(psychrophiles) are thought to have consumed a significant amount of the remaining oil. 
Future research will no doubt help resolve the debate. 
 
Box 2 below shows some of the main affected species. The fact that some species are 
breeding or starting their nesting season, as well the chemical composition of the oil and 
dispersants are all expected to have a bearing on the effects of the spill. Scientists, 
however, warn that the effects on some species will not be precisely known until new 
crops of fish appear. 
 
Box 2. Some key species affected by the BP oil spill 
Mammals Birds Fish & Shellfish Reptiles 
• West Indian 
manatees 
• Bottlenose dolphins 
• Sperm whales 
• Blue whales 
• Humpback whales  
• North Atlantic right 
whales 
• River otters 
• Mink 
• Swamp rabbits 
• Egrets 
• Herons 
• Ibises 
• Roseate spoonbills 
• Brown pelicans 
• Wilson's plovers 
• Royal terns 
• Gulls 
• Diving ducks 
• Wading birds 
• Pipping plover 
• Shearwaters 
• Northern gannets 
• Frigate birds 
• Yellow fin tuna 
• Blue tuna 
• Blue crabs 
• Gulf stone crab 
• Sharks 
• Oysters 
• Shrimp 
• Snappers 
• Groupers 
• Scalloped 
hammerhead 
• Shortfin &longfin 
mako 
• Bigeye thresher  
• Oceanic whitetip 
sharks 
• Swordfish 
• White & blue 
marlins 
• Longbill spearfish  
• Sailfish 
• Grey triggerfish 
• Red & black 
drums 
• Dolphins 
• King & Spanish 
mackerel 
• Loggerhead turtle 
• Green turtle 
• Kemp’s ridley turtle 
• Leatherback turtle 
• Hawksbill turtle 
Source: National wildlife Federation and NOAA (2010). 
                                                 
14 http://uga.edu/aboutUGA/joye_pkit/GeorgiaSeaGrant_OilSpillReport8-16.pdf. 
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In addition to these species, habitats that provide them with breeding and nesting grounds 
as well as food and shelter have also been exposed to the spill. These include, among 
others, mudflats, beaches, reefs, mangroves and wetlands. As regards the latter, the 
Society for Wetland Scientists said in May 2010 that the extent of the damage will depend 
on the type of wetland, the species inhabiting it, the type of oil and its weathering. In this 
respect, they claim that the wetlands in the Gulf of Mexico are sensitive to the oil spilled 
and that recovery might only be possible in the long term. 
 
Map 2 below shows the oiled area and some of the key species affected. 
 
Map 2. Main areas affected by the spill 
 
Source: 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/public_lands/energy/dirty_energy_development/oil_and_gas/gulf_oil_spill/map.h
tml. 
 
Ex-ante and ex-post assessments of the state of natural resources are paramount in order 
to tailor clean-up and restoration projects. In this respect, the NOAA through its Damage 
Assessment and Restoration Program in conjunction with the Department of the Interior 
and BP are undertaking continuous data collection tasks to enable the analysis of the 
impact on plants, animals and habitats. Around 1,800 miles of shoreline were analysed 
through the collection of more than 11,000 samples.15 Additional efforts to assess 
damages by universities and NGOs such as Greenpeace16 will no doubt provide 
significant information on the state of the environment. 
 
Social Consequences 
The most salient social consequences of the spill include both health issues and 
temporary or permanent employment losses. The population most exposed and affected 
by the BP spill includes, among others, employees in marine and related sectors, citizens 
living in the areas affected and clean-up workers and volunteers. Despite the fact that 
experts consider the health effects of oil spills have so far been under-researched, there 
have been calls for health workers in the Gulf Coast to be attentive to both short-term and 
long-term health effects. These can include increased anxiety, depression, post-traumatic 
                                                 
15 http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/. 
16 http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/Blogs/makingwaves/greenpeace-ship-arctic-sunrise-to-
perform-ind/blog/12967. 
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stress disorders, damages to internal organs such as the lungs, kidney and liver and the 
increased risk of cancer.17 
 
The unemployment rates prior to the spill ranged from 11% in Alabama to 11.5% in 
Mississippi and 12% in Florida.18 Despite the fact that the effect on employment may be 
smaller than initial estimates, Maps 3 and 4 are interesting as they show the potential 
socio-economic vulnerability of the affected states. This information could help tailor future 
employment initiatives. 
 
Map 3. Employment in agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 
 
Source: http://www.lsu.edu/pa/photos/20100430/2009ag.jpg. 
 
Map 4. Median household income 
 
Source: http://www.lsu.edu/pa/photos/20100430/2008median.jpg. 
                                                 
17 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-16/gulf-oil-spill-may-have-long-term-consequences-on-health-
researchers-say.html. 
18 http://money.cnn.com/2010/06/08/smallbusiness/bp_hiring_unemployed/index.htm. 
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Future Developments 
If we are to tackle the underlying causes of oil spills, it will be necessary to address the 
issue of dependency. This will entail painful yet needed internalisation of the external 
costs of oil production, distribution and consumption. The policy instruments, their 
advantages, disadvantages and agents’ resistances are not new. Command and control-
type approaches can provide theoretical certainty and can be called for when emergency 
situations are to be addressed, despite their potential lack of static and dynamic 
efficiency. Reducing or eliminating harmful subsidies that make oil-use inefficiently cheap 
can also be a socially palatable option, yet resistance is to be expected from certain 
powerful groups. Increasing taxes on oil can send a clear message but regressive effects 
have to be considered and no certain outcomes can be guaranteed. 
 
Despite the fact that it may be too soon to draw any definitive conclusions, according to 
the Department of the Interior, improvements in safety equipment, personnel training and 
operational responses have also been hailed as a must to face future spills.19 
 
Table 2 shows the Department of the Interior’s safety recommendations. 
 
Table 2. Improvements in safety after the Deepwater Horizon explosion 
 
Source: Department of the Interior (2010: 5). 
                                                 
19 http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=33598. 
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From a policy perspective, the EU has been quick to start thinking about its own risk 
exposure as regards offshore oil drilling. In the aftermath of the BP spill, on 11 May and 
later on 14 July, the EU’s Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger met oil and gas 
industry representatives20 operating in EU waters to ensure adequate safety measures 
were in place. Acknowledging the impossibility of avoiding all spills, Oettinger stressed the 
need to achieve the maximum possible safety levels, not only in the regulatory realm but 
also in the operational arena. No definitive initiatives arose from these meetings but more 
stringent safety conditions and plans for temporary bans cannot be ruled out. 
 
Conclusions: This year’s Earth Day celebrations have been soaked in oil in the US. The 
BP spill should not have happened but current and expected oil thirst coupled with 
suboptimal preparedness in deep offshore drilling has resulted in what some have been 
quick to label Obama’s Katrina, in part due to past regulatory complacency as regards 
safety requirements. The loss of lives is a tragedy. Social, economic and environmental 
consequences are yet to be fully estimated but there is little doubt that they will be 
significant. It should be borne in mind, however, that the environment affected can be 
expected to recover, although in the long term, provided no thresholds are reached for 
vulnerable species and habitats. 
 
A reactive and short-lived social and political attention span towards risk will only result in 
fickle policy ripples. Some improved safety measures (the proximate cause) are 
nevertheless expected to result from the spill. Additionally, the oil industry is likely to have 
heard the loud and clear wake-up call about safety in all its operations (the intermediate 
causes). The extent to which the industry will place safety at the heart of all its operations 
will depend on where it operates and on the regulatory ‘thrill’ (Tan, 2006) spurred in the 
aftermath of the BP spill. A shift away from oil (the underlying cause) seems unlikely to 
result from one incident although it may help push forward initiatives such as removing 
harmful subsidies or establishing earmarked taxation on drilling activities. Equity 
considerations should also be considered in order to avoid inequitable outcomes. 
 
Paul Isbell 
Director of Energy and Climate Change Programme and Senior Analyst responsible for 
the ‘Spain-US Relations’ project, Elcano Royal Institute 
 
Lara Lázaro 
Analyst, Elcano Royal Institute 
                                                 
20 The firms attending this meeting included OGP, BP, BP Group, ConocoPhilips, Apache, Chevron, ENI, 
ExxonMobil, Nexen, Repsol, Shell, Statoil, Maersk 0&G and Total. 
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